Project

# Title Team Members TA Documents Sponsor
69 Shamir Secret Self-Destruct USB
Alex Clemens
Danny Metzger
Varun Sivasubramanian
Michael Gamota design_document1.pdf
final_paper1.pdf
grading_sheet1.pdf
presentation1.pdf
proposal1.pdf
# Team Members
- Varun Sivasubramanian (vsiva4)
- Alex Clemens (clemens9)
- Danny Metzger (djm14)

# Problem

Traditional USB flash drives pose a security risk if lost or stolen, especially for highly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys, classified documents, or personal information. Even if encrypted, existing encrypted USBs rely on software-based security, which is vulnerable to forensic recovery or brute-force attacks. Some physical destruction, like crushing or snapping, may still leave recoverable data on the drive. Furthermore, USB devices often do not enforce security via the device itself.

# Solution
A custom USB flash drive with built-in cryptographic security and hardware self-destruction, ensuring that sensitive data cannot be recovered under any circumstances. The system will:
- Encrypt and split the drive's decryption key using Shamir’s Secret Sharing across multiple physical hardware keys.
Require a threshold number of shares (⅔) to reconstruct the key and decrypt the data.
- Trigger a hardware-based self-destruct mechanism under various circumstances.
- Ensure complete destruction by physically rendering the flash memory unreadable.

# Solution Components

## Subsystem 1: Shamir Secret & YubiKey Authentication
Purpose: Ensures multi-factor authentication and prevents software access by restricting key reconstruction to hardware.

Components:
- Microcontroller: ESP32, STM32 or similar. Should handle reading YubiKeys and managing key reconstruction along with triggering destruction.
- Secure Element: AES-256 Encryption capable. Handles all cryptographic operations and is tamperproof.
- 3 USB-C YubiKeys: Hold each share of the Shamir Secret in a ⅔ authentication.

Upon first connection, the user is able to set up Shamir Secrets by plugging in all YubiKeys and initiating the MCU and SE to create the shares.

## Subsystem 2: Storage System
Purpose: The flash drive should still have traditional storage and functionality. Conceals encrypted portion unless Shamir is reconstructed. With partitioning, an unencrypted partition should also be allowed.

Components:
- Flash NAND storage: Any small size (8-16GB) is good. Should support basic partitioning.
- USB Mass Storage Controller: Facilitates communication with the computer.
- External USB-C ports: Allow YubiKeys to be connected to the PCB
- USB-A or USB-C interface: Plugs into the computer.

The encryption of the storage will be done by the secure element.

## Subsystem 3: Hardware Self-Destruction
Purpose: Ensures that if there is a potential attacker, the storage is permanently destroyed. The exact method of self-destruction is contingent on circuit design, but a voltage overload is most feasible.

Components:
- Boost Converter: Steps voltage to create destruction.
- MOSFET: Switches from normal functioning to destruction voltage.
- 2 LiPo or CR2032 batteries: Allows destruction to take place even when unplugged.
- Tamper detection circuit: A circuit that detects when two pins are no longer in contact i.e. when the casing has been opened up.

Trigger Mechanisms:
There are multiple triggers that lead to frying the NAND. Multiple YubiKey fail attempts, opening the physical casing, or attempting to access the Secure Element should trigger the self-destruction. The MOSFET should direct high voltage directly to the NAND, irreversibly damaging memory.

# Criterion for Success
1. Shamir Secret: The Shamir key can only be reconstructed via firmware on the physical drive, not on a computer.
2. Irreversible: Destruction of the NAND is irreversible. Data should not be recoverable.
3. Tamper-Resistant: Removing casing or tampering with the SE should lead to destruction.

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