



BackDoor: Sensing Out-of-band Sounds through Channel Nonlinearity




Nirupam Roy

ECE-420 Guest Lecture - 30th October 2017
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign


Microphones are everywhere




Microphones are everywhere




Microphones record audible sounds




Inaudible, but recordable !




Inaudible, but recordable !



Works with unmodified devices



It's not "near-ultrasound"



chirp.io

Pseudo-ranging

SenSys'12

ApneaApp

MobiSys'15

DopLink

UbiComp'13

SoundWave

CHI'12



lisnr.com

AAMouse

MobiSys'15

AirLink

UbiComp'14



Spartacus


MobiSys'13

Crowd-counting

SenSys'12




Exploiting fundamental nonlinearity



What can we do with it?

Opportunities: Acoustic jammer



Application: Acoustic communication



Threat: Acoustic DOS attack



Jamming
hearing aids



Threat: Acoustic DOS attack



Jamming
hearing aids



Blocking
911 calls



Threats: Inaudible voice attack



Talk outline

- ① Microphone Overview
- ② System Design
- ③ Challenges
- ④ Evaluation

Talk outline


① Microphone Overview

② System Design


③ Challenges

④ Evaluation



Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle



Microphone working principle





Microphone working principle





$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in}$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2 + a_3 V_{in}^3 + \dots$$





Amplifier

Microphone working principle





$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in}$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$





Amplifier

Microphone working principle



$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in}$$

$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$



Talk outline


① Microphone Overview

② System Design


③ Challenges

④ Evaluation

Exploiting amplifier non-linearity




Exploiting amplifier non-linearity



$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$\begin{aligned} (\sin F_1 + \sin F_2)^2 = & \cos 2F_1 \\ & + \cos 2F_2 \\ & + \cos (F_1 + F_2) \\ & + \cos (F_1 - F_2) \end{aligned}$$

Exploiting amplifier non-linearity




$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$

$$(\sin F_1 + \sin F_2)^2 =$$

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Exploiting amplifier non-linearity




$$V_{out} = a_1 V_{in} + a_2 V_{in}^2$$


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
Exploiting amplifier non-linearity



Exploiting amplifier non-linearity




Exploiting amplifier non-linearity




Talk outline

- ① Microphone Overview
- ② System Design
- ③ Challenges
- ④ Evaluation

Challenges




Challenges





Speaker's
nonlinearity




Microphone's
nonlinearity



Challenges




Microphone's
nonlinearity



Challenges


~~Amplitude
modulation~~



Ultrasonic
speaker

Challenges

Frequency
modulation



Ultrasonic
speaker

Challenges

- Signal self-demodulation
- Piezoelectric ringing effect
- Carrier intermixing
- Spectrum inversion
- Carrier power allocation

Talk outline



- ① Microphone Overview
- ② System Design
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- ④ Evaluation

Threats: Inaudible voice attack

Live Demo: Attacking Amazon Echo though inaudible sound



Hardware generalizability



Hearing Aid



Camera



iPhone



Android phone




Smartwatch




Laptop

Implementation




Communication
prototype



Jammer
prototype

Communication performance




FM data packets

4kbps
up to 1 meter



More power can increase the distance

Jamming performance




BackDoor jammer



Spy
microphone

Jamming performance




BackDoor jammer




Spy
microphone

Jamming performance




Jamming performance




BackDoor jammer




Spy
microphone



Jamming performance




BackDoor jammer




Jamming performance

2000 spoken words




BackDoor jammer




Jammed recording

Jamming performance

2000 spoken words



BackDoor jammer



Jammed recording




Human
listener




Speech
recognition

Jamming performance

2000 spoken words



BackDoor jammer



Jammed recording




Human listener



Speech recognition

% of legible words

Jamming performance



Jamming performance



Takeaways

- ① Specially designed inaudible sound can be recorded with unmodified microphone
- ② It can make acoustic jammer possible and also can be a communication channel
- ③ It also uncovers threats like acoustic Denial-of-Service attacks


Ripple: Communication through Physical Vibration

Short range communication: a new need of this decade



Short range communication: a new need of this decade





Emerging technologies for short range



Driving forces of short range communication research

Emerging technologies for short range



Emerging technologies for short range


Security / Privacy

Capacity



Driving forces of short range communication research

Emerging technologies for short range



Driving forces of short range communication research

Emerging technologies for short range


Visible Light Communication





Acoustic NFC





Physical vibration: a new mode of communication








Vibration Motor



Accelerometer




Vibration Motor




Accelerometer




Morse Code Key



Vibration Motor



Modulated vibration




Accelerometer


Applications: Mobile Money Transfer



Applications: Mobile Money Transfer



Applications: Authentication with Ring



Applications: Authentication with Ring



Applications: Authentication with Ring



Applications: Body-Area Network






Or...maybe you can come up with a better one

Ripple: Communicating through Physical Vibrations



Ripple data-rate



(bits-per-second, entry level versions)

Ripple-II: Faster Communication through Physical Vibration

RIPPLE-II: FASTER COMMUNICATION THROUGH
PHYSICAL VIBRATION
AUDIO STREAMING DEMO
(32KBPS)

Thank You

Website: <http://nroy8.web.engr.illinois.edu>

SyNRG group website: <http://synrg.csl.illinois.edu>