Defining Encryption

Lecture 2

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Towards Defining Secrecy
against the Computationally Bounded

Roadmap

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- First, Symmetric Key Encryption

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- Today: defining symmetric-key encryption

Building the Model

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- Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice and Bob share a key (a bit string)



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

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- Alice can send out a bit string on the channel. Bob and Eve both get it



Encryption: Syntax



Encryption: Syntax

- Three algorithms
  - Key Generation: What Alice and Bob do a priori, for creating the shared secret key
  - Encryption: What Alice does with the message and the key to obtain a "ciphertext"
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

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- All of these are (probabilistic) computations



Modeling Computation



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- In our model (standard model) parties are programs (computations, say Turing Machines)



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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The Environment



The Environment

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

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

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

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

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

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

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  - Abstract entity from which the input comes and to which the output goes. Arbitrarily influenced by Eve



Defining Security



Defining Security

- Eve shouldn't be able to produce any "bad effects" in any environment



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

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

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

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    - Anything that Eve couldn't have caused if an "ideal channel" was used



Defining Security

The REAL/IDEAL Paradigm



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

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

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

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- Eve shouldn't produce any more effects than she could have in the ideal world
  - IDEAL world: Message sent over a (physically) secure channel. No encryption in this world.
  - REAL world: Using encryption
  - Encryption is secure if whatever Eve can do in the REAL world (using some strategy), she can do in the IDEAL world too (using an appropriate strategy)



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

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

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

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

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

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Defining Security

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

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

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

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∀

∃ s.t.

∀

output of

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

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- We will see three definitions of symmetric-key encryption
  - Security of "one-time encryption"
  - Security of (muti-message) encryption
  - Security against "active attacks"
- Will also see alternate (but essentially equivalent) security definitions

Onetime Encryption

Onetime Encryption

The Syntax

- Shared-key (Private-key) Encryption
  - Key Generation: Randomized
    - K ← $\mathcal{K}$, uniformly randomly drawn from the key-space (or according to a key-distribution)
  - Encryption: Deterministic
    - Enc: $\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
  - Decryption: Deterministic
    - Dec: $\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$

Onetime Encryption

Perfect Secrecy

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Perfect Secrecy

- Perfect secrecy: $\forall$ m, m′ $\in \mathcal{M}$
  - $\{\mathrm{Enc}(m,K)\}_{K\leftarrow \mathrm{KeyGen}} = \{\mathrm{Enc}(m',K)\}_{K\leftarrow \mathrm{KeyGen}}$

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$\mathcal{M}$ \ $\mathcal{K}$	0	1	2	3
a	x	y	y	z
b	y	x	z	y

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Assuming K uniformly drawn from $\mathcal{K}$

Pr[Enc(a,K)=x] = ¼,
Pr[Enc(a,K)=y] = ½,
Pr[Enc(a,K)=z] = ¼

Same for Enc(b,K).

Onetime Encryption

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  - $\{Enc(m,K)\}_{K \leftarrow KeyGen} = \{Enc(m',K)\}_{K \leftarrow KeyGen}$
- Distribution of the ciphertext is defined by the randomness in the key
- In addition, require correctness
  - $\forall$ m, K,   Dec(Enc(m,K), K) = m

$\mathcal{M}$ \ $\mathcal{K}$	0	1	2	3
a	x	y	y	z
b	y	x	z	y

Assuming K uniformly drawn from $\mathcal{K}$

Pr[Enc(a,K)=x] = ¼,
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Same for Enc(b,K).

Onetime Encryption

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  - More generally $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C} = \mathcal{G}$ (a finite group) and Enc(m,K) = m+K, Dec(c,K) = c−K

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Onetime Encryption

SIM-Onetime Security



Onetime Encryption

SIM-Onetime Security

- Class of environments which send only one message



Onetime Encryption

SIM-Onetime Security

Equivalent to perfect secrecy + correctness

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

Perfect Secrecy + Correctness ⇒ SIM-Onetime Security



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

Consider this simulator: Runs adversary internally and lets it talk to the environment directly!



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Onetime Encryption

IND-Onetime Security

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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- IND-Onetime secure if for every adversary, Pr[b′=b] = 1/2



Onetime Encryption

IND-Onetime Security

Equivalent to perfect secrecy

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

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- SIM- definitions give the big picture, but may not give details of what is involved in satisfying it. Could be "too strong"
- Best of both worlds when they are equivalent:
use IND- definition while say, proving security of a construction;
use SIM- definition when low-level details are not important