Pairing-Based Cryptography & Generic Groups

Lecture 19

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    - Not degenerate: e(g,g,) ≠ 1
- D-BDH Assumption: For random (a,b,c,z), the distributions of (g^a,g^b,g^c,g^{abc}) and (g^a,g^b,g^c,g^z) are indistinguishable

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  - e.g. Alice computes $e(g,g)^{abc} = e(g^b,g^c)^a$
  - By D-BDH the key $e(g,g)^{abc} = e(g,g^{abc})$ is pseudorandom given eavesdropper's view (g^a,g^b,g^c)

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  - Trivial if only one witness. Very useful when two kinds of witnesses

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  - May exploit similar assumptions as used in the basic scheme

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  - (where $A,B \in G$, integers a,b,c are known to both)
- Useful in proving statements like "these two commitments are to the same value", or "I have a signature for a message with a certain property", when appropriate commitment/signature scheme is used

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  - When $e:G_1 x G_2 \rightarrow G_T$: DDH in G_1 and/or G_2
  - When G has composite order: Pseudorandomness of random elements from a prime order subgroup of G.

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- Useful in at least "prototyping" new primitives (e.g. IBE)

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  - In addition, if modeling a group with bilinear pairing, also provides the pairing operation and operations for the target group

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  - And an exhaustive analysis in terms of formal polynomials to show requisite security properties

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- Better practice: when possible identify simple (new) assumptions sufficient for the security of the scheme. Then prove the assumption in the generic group model

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- KEA-DH: Given g, if a PPT adversary outputs (g^a,g^b,g^{ab}) it "must know" either a or b

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- KEA-1: Given (g,g^a) for a random generator g and random a, if a PPT adversary extends it to a DDH tuple (g,g^a,g^b,g^{ab}) then it "must know" b
- KEA-3: Given (g,g^a,g^b,g^{ab}) for random g,a,b, if a PPT adversary outputs (h,h') such that $h'=h^b$, then it "must know" c_1, c_2 such that $h=g^{c1}\,(g^a)^{c2}$ (and $h'=(g^b)^{c1}\,(g^{ab})^{c2}$)
  - By "fixing" KEA-2 (which forgot to consider c_1)
- KEA-DH: Given g, if a PPT adversary outputs (g^a,g^b,g^{ab}) it "must know" either a or b
- All provable in the generic group model (for g with large order)

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- KEA-DH: Given g, if a PPT adversary outputs (g^a,g^b,g^{ab}) it "must know" either a or b
- All provable in the generic group model (for g with large order)
  - Even if the group has a bilinear pairing operation

Today

Today

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Today

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  - Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumptions