

TODAY :

* Learning With Errors (LWE)

* (Cryptographic) Pseudorandomness

* Private - Key Encryption

* Public - Key Encryption

NOTE

Given $A_{n \times m}, b$ find s s.t. $As = b$
↑
"short"

SIS problem on $A_{n \times m}, s_{m \times 1}, b_{n \times 1}$
↑ (# equations) ↑ "short"

- When $m \gg n \frac{\log q}{\log B}$, many solutions exist
Total SIS (# variables) (# columns)

- When $m \ll n \frac{\log q}{\log B}$, no solutions exist (unless you plant one)
LWE \equiv Planted SIS (m) ($m-n$)
 $A \quad b$
Pick A . Then pick "short" s . Then set $b = As$

Hardness of solving systems of linear equations (modulo a prime)

$$14s_1 + 15s_2 + 5s_3 + 2s_4 = 8 \pmod{17}$$

$$13s_1 + 14s_2 + 14s_3 + 6s_4 = 16 \pmod{17}$$

$$6s_1 + 10s_2 + 13s_3 + 15s_4 = 3 \pmod{17}$$

$$8s_1 + 7s_2 + 16s_3 + 25s_4 = 2 \pmod{17}$$

$$e \in \{0, \dots, q-1\}$$

↪ "short" $\in \{-1, 0, 1\}$

$$14s_1 + 15s_2 + 5s_3 + 2s_4 + e_1 = 8 \pmod{17}$$

$$13s_1 + 14s_2 + \dots + e_2 = 16 \pmod{17}$$

$$6s_1 + 10s_2 + \dots + e_3 = 3 \pmod{17}$$

$$8s_1 + 7s_2 + \dots + e_4 = 2 \pmod{17}$$

$$As + e = b$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \underbrace{A^\perp}_{\text{red}} \\
 \left[\begin{array}{c} A \\ \Delta \\ e \end{array} \right] + \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{"short"} \\ \vdots \\ b \end{array} \right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{array} \right] \\
 \begin{array}{c}
 \downarrow \text{ } \\
 \begin{array}{c}
 \tilde{m} \times \tilde{n} \\
 \downarrow \\
 (\# \text{ equations})
 \end{array}
 \end{array}
 \begin{array}{c}
 \downarrow \text{ } \\
 \begin{array}{c}
 n \times 1 \\
 \downarrow \\
 (\# \text{ variables})
 \end{array}
 \end{array}
 \end{array}
 \quad m = n^2$$

Problem: Given A, b
find s .

$$\begin{aligned}
 n^2 &\sim n^2 - n \\
 m &\sim m - n \gg n \\
 m &= n^2 \\
 n &\log 2 \sim n
 \end{aligned}$$

For any matrix A , one can find the "kernel" of A

This is a full-rank set of vectors A^\perp s.t. $A^\perp A = 0_{(m-n) \times n}$

To reduce LWE to SIS,

Given A, b , compute $\underline{c} = A^\perp b = \underline{A^\perp e}$


(A, b) LWE

$\hookrightarrow \underbrace{(A, c)}_{\text{SIS}}$ is an SIS instance whose solution is e .

$$A^\perp$$

$(m-n) \times (m)$

\approx



$(m-n)$ equations in m variables

LWE

"Search" LWE n, m, q, χ

\forall nu PPT \mathcal{D} ,

$$\Pr [\mathcal{D}(A, Aste) \rightarrow s] = \text{negl}(n)$$

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$$

$$s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 1}$$

$$e \leftarrow \chi^m$$

"Decision" LWE n, m, q, χ

\forall nu PPT \mathcal{D} ,

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(A, Aste) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(A, b) = 1] \right|$$
$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n} \quad A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$$
$$s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 1} \quad b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$$
$$e \leftarrow \chi^m$$
$$= \text{negl}(n)$$

Claim

If SIS is easy, then $A^{m \times n}$ Planted SIS is also easy
"Total"
 $m = n^2$

Given $A^{m \times n}$, $b^{m \times 1}$ is either
 A , uniform
 $A, A_s + e$
or "short" \tilde{s} if SIS is easy
such that $A^T \tilde{s} = 0$

multiply b^T with \tilde{s}

$$b^T = s^T A^T + e^T$$
$$b^T \tilde{s} = \underbrace{s^T A^T \tilde{s}}_{= 0} + \underbrace{e^T \tilde{s}}$$

\Rightarrow If A, b was an LWE sample,
 $b^T \tilde{s}$ would be "short".

ofw $b^T \tilde{s}$ would not.

LWE is "stronger assumption" than SIS.

SIS \equiv "Total" SIS

LWE \equiv "Planted" SIS.

If SIS assumption is false,

then LWE assumption is false.

Quantumly, if LWE assumption is false,

then SIS assumption is false.
(Not known under classical reductions)

PSEUDORANDOMNESS

"unpredictability"

$f : \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k$ is a OWF.

Sample $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$

Q: Is the following true?

\forall nu PPT \mathcal{A}

$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k} [\mathcal{A}(f(x)) \text{ outputs the first bit of } x] = \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(k)$

A: This is false

Given f , construct g s.t. $g(x) = x || f(x)$

g is still one-way!

H.W.: Use any Adv that inverts g , to invert f .

Hard Core Predicate

A H.C.P. of an n -^{injective} bWF $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ is a boolean predicate $B: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ such that

- $\forall x$, $B(x)$ is easy to compute

- \forall mPPT A , $\forall c \in \mathbb{N}$, $\exists k_0$ s.t. $\forall k > k_0$,

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k} [A(1^k, \underline{f(x)}) = \underline{B(x)}] = \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(k)$$

pseudorandomness:

"small" "true" randomness

↓ EXPAND

"large" "pseudo" random

Computational Indistinguishability

Def. Two distribution ensembles $X = \{X_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $Y = \{Y_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ are comp. indistinguishable if

$$\forall \text{ nu PPT } \mathcal{D}, \left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow X_k} [\mathcal{D}(x) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow Y_k} [\mathcal{D}(y) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(k)$$

$$X \underset{\text{comp. ind.}}{\approx} Y$$

$$\left\{ f(x), B(x) \right\}_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k} \approx \left\{ f(x), B(x) + 1 \right\}_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k} \approx \left\{ f(x), \text{Uniform} \right\}$$

if B is a H.C.P.,

$$\left\{ \underline{f(x)}, \underline{B(x)} \right\} \approx \left\{ \underline{f(x)}, \underline{B(x) + 1} \right\}$$


$$x = 01 \dots 01$$

$$B(x) = 0$$

If f is inj., then the 2 dist. have disjoint support.

$$A^t \cdot (A^\perp)^t = 0.$$

$$A^\perp A = 0_{(m-n) \times n}$$



$(m-n) \cdot n$ equations in $(m-n) \cdot m$ variables

$$\begin{aligned}
 b_{11} a_{11} + b_{12} a_{21} + \dots &= 0 \\
 b_{21} a_{12} + b_{22} a_{22} + \dots &= 0 \\
 \vdots & \\
 b_{m-n,1} &
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\# \text{ rows in } A = \# \text{ rows in } A^\perp + \text{rank of } A$$

ALT.

$$\# \text{ columns in } A^t = \# \text{ columns in } (A^\perp)^t + \text{rank of } A.$$

