



LECTURE - 17




Graph 3-coloring : challenge space = # edges

Stern-like : challenge space = $\{1, 2, 3\}$



IN PRACTICE: Fiat-Shamir transform.



(Random Oracle): On every input, produces uniformly random output.

Assume SHA256 behaves like a Random Oracle.

[Heuristic]

Resulting N.I.P. is simulatable (zk) in Random Oracle Model.

In theory, there exist hash functions

(Fiat-Shamir: From Practice to Theory)

s.t. F-S for certain types of Σ -protocols is sound (and simulatable).

(Lec 14)

Sim(x)

V(x)



View_{sim(x)}

P(x)

V(x)



View_{real(x)}


View_{sim} \approx View_{real}.

\Rightarrow View_{sim(x)} should be an accepting proof.
For NP-hard languages Sim(x) cannot decide whether $x \in L$.

\Rightarrow View_{sim(x)} should be accepting ^{even} when $x \notin L$.

"Rewinding". In ROM, Sim programs RO.

TODAY, Non-Black-Box Simulation



Q: Given $\text{FHE} \cdot \text{Enc}(s)$ and an arbitrary circuit V , is it possible to efficiently compute $\text{FHE} \cdot \text{Enc}(V(s))$?

YES, assuming V lies in the class of circuits that FHE supports

How about when you don't have circuit V , but only have input-output access to V ?

$\text{FHE} \cdot \text{Enc}(s)$ → V oracle
 $V(\text{FHE} \cdot \text{Enc}(s))$ ←

Unclear.

GOAL: Design NBB ZK proof system

Prover

Verifier

random pk, s .

$FHE \cdot Enc(s), pk$

$Enc(s)$

If s , then CHALLENGE
otherwise 0.

$Enc(challenge)$

If $Enc(challenge) \stackrel{H}{=} challenge$

COMMIT

CHALLENGE


RESPONSE

$Enc(state)$

FORCE V to
USE same
CHALLENGE

Simulator

Verifier



Sim obtained $FHE.Enc_{pk}(CHALLENGE)$.


Must now find a way to decrypt.

Selective decryption of $FHE.Enc(CHALLENGE)$.

SECURITY.

If $lock \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $\hat{c} \approx_c \text{Obf}(f, \alpha, 0)$

[i.e. msg is semantically hidden].



Can be obtained from LWE!

DISTINGUISHER-DEPENDENT ZK,

$\forall V, \forall \mathcal{D}, \exists \text{Sim s.t. simulated-view} \approx \text{real view}$
by distinguisher \mathcal{D}


\mathcal{P}

V



Sim

V



\mathcal{D}

(Impossible via rewinding)

[Bitansky-Khurana-Paneth 19]

POST - QUANTUM ZK

[BITANSKY - SHMUELI 20].