

# Selfish Routing

Thursday, October 27, 2022 11:01 AM

Case Study: N/W over Provisioning.

ISPs: Provide "more capacity than needed!"


→ Improves the overall delay.

→ Better than design + implementation of smart GOS.

$$c_e(x) = \frac{1}{\mu_e - x} \quad \text{if } x < \mu_e$$

↑  
capacity

$$= \infty \quad \text{if } x \geq \mu_e$$




\* n/w is over provisioned if at "NE"

$$f_e \leq (1-\gamma)\mu_e$$

( $\gamma$  fraction of the capacity is not utilized)

$$PoA \sim \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{8}} \right)$$



$$\gamma = 1 \Rightarrow PoA = 1$$

$$\gamma \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow PoA \rightarrow \infty$$

$$\gamma = 0.1 \Rightarrow PoA \sim 2!$$

Thm: Given  $e$ , n/w  $G=(V,E)$ ,  $s, t \in V$ ,  
 $r \geq 0$ ,  $r$  units of flow from  $s$  to  $t$ ,  
 $\dots$   $r \in P$

$r \geq 0$ ,  $r$  units of  $v$

$\forall e \in E, c_e \in \mathbb{R}$

$f$ : NE flow of  $r$  units  $\equiv$  (ISP example  
 $f^*$ : opt flow of (2r) units  $\equiv$  (NE flow of capacity  $u_e$   
 opt " " "  $\frac{u_e}{2}$ )

Then

$$\text{cost}(f) \leq \text{cost}(f^*)$$

Pr:  $L = \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \varphi(f)$

$f$  is NE  $\Rightarrow f_p > 0 \Rightarrow \varphi(f) = L \quad \forall p \in \mathcal{P}$ .

$$\therefore \text{cost}(f) = \boxed{\sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p \varphi(f) = L \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p = L \cdot r}$$

$$\text{cost}\left(\begin{array}{l} f^* \text{ w/ cost on each} \\ \text{edge } e \text{ fixed to } c_e(f_e) \end{array}\right) = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p^* \varphi(f) \geq L \cdot \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p^* = L \cdot (2r)$$

$$\text{cost}(f) = L \cdot r = \underline{2Lr} - Lr \leq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p^* \varphi(f) - Lr \\ \leq \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p^* \varphi(f^*) = \text{cost}(f^*) \end{array} \right.$$

$\Downarrow$

$$\sum_P f_p^* \varphi(f) - \sum_P f_p \varphi(f) \leq \sum_P f_p^* \varphi(f^*)$$

$$\therefore \sum_P f_p \varphi(f) \leq \sum_P f_p \varphi(f^*) \leq \sum_P f_p \varphi(f)$$

$$\sum_P f_P^* (c_P(f)) - \sum_P f_P^* (c_P(f^*)) \leq \sum_P f_P (c_P(f))$$

$$\sum_e f_e^* (c_e(f_e)) - \sum_e f_e^* (c_e(f_e^*)) \leq \sum_e f_e (c_e(f_e))$$

claim:  $f_e^* (c_e(f_e) - c_e(f_e^*)) \leq f_e (c_e(f_e)) \quad \forall e$

Pr: case I:  $f_e^* \leq f_e$

$$\Rightarrow f_e^* (c_e(f_e) - c_e(f_e^*)) \leq f_e (c_e(f_e))$$

case II:  $f_e^* > f_e \Rightarrow c_e(f_e^*) \geq c_e(f_e)$   
 $\Rightarrow (c_e(f_e) - c_e(f_e^*)) \leq 0$

## Atomic Selfish Routing

$\rightarrow G = (V, E)$


$\rightarrow N = \{1, \dots, n\}$

$\rightarrow i \in N$  wants to go from  $s_i$  to  $t_i$

$P_i$  = set of  $s_i$ - $t_i$  paths.

$P_i \in \mathcal{P}_i \rightarrow P = (P_1, \dots, P_n)$

$f_e^P = f_e = \# \text{ agents taking edge } e \text{ in } P.$



$\forall e: c_e: \{0, 1, \dots, n\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  non-dec.

$C_i(P) = \sum_{e \in P_i} c_e(f_e^P)$   $\forall i: \text{cost}(P) = \sum_{i \in N} C_i(P)$   
 $\leq \sum_e c_e(f_e^P)$

$$G_i(P) = \sum_{e \in P_i} c_e(x_e)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \sum_{i \in N} \sum_{e \in P_i} c_e(x_e) \\
 &= \sum_e c_e(x_e) \sum_{\substack{i \in N: \\ e \in P_i}} 1 \\
 &= \sum_e c_e(x_e) \cdot f_e
 \end{aligned}$$

$$PoA = \max_{NE: f} \frac{\text{cost}(f)}{\text{cost}(\text{OPT flow})}$$

$P$  is a NE iff  $\forall i: G_i(P_i, P_{-i}) \leq G_i(q_i, P_{-i}) \quad \forall q_i \in P_i$

$$C = \{a_e x + b_e \mid a_e, b_e \geq 0\} \text{ (affine).}$$


Thm:  $PoA(\text{affine}) \leq 5/2$  (where  $c_e(x) = a_e x + b_e, a_e, b_e \geq 0$ )

Proof:  $P$  is a NE  
 $P^*$  is an OPT

$f_e = \#$  agents taking edge  $e$  in NE  $P$   
 $f_e^* = \#$  agents taking edge  $e$  in OPT  $P^*$

$$P \text{ is NE} \Rightarrow \forall i: G_i(P_i, P_{-i}) \leq G_i(P_i^*, P_{-i}) \quad \forall i$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \sum_{e \in P_i^* \setminus P_i} c_e(f_e + 1) + \sum_{e \in P_i \cap P_i^*} c_e(f_e) \\
 &\leq \sum_{e \in P_i^*} c_e(f_e + 1)
 \end{aligned}$$



$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\text{cost}(P)}{\text{cost}(P^*)} &= \frac{\sum_i G_i(P)}{\sum_i G_i(P_i^*, P_{-i})} \leq \frac{\sum_i G_i(P_i^*, P_{-i})}{\sum_e c_e(f_e + 1)}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\text{cost}(P)}{i} \leq \dots$$

$$\leq \sum_i \sum_{e \in P_i^*} c_e(f_{e+1})$$

$$= \sum_e c_e(f_{e+1}) \sum_{\substack{i \in N: \\ e \in P_i^*}} 1 = \sum_e c_e(f_{e+1}) f_e^*$$

$$= \sum_e c_e(f_{e+1}) f_e^*$$

$$= \sum_{e \in E} [a_e(f_{e+1}) + b_e] \cdot f_e^*$$

$$= \sum_{e \in E} a_e \underset{x}{f_e^*} (f_{e+1}) + b_e \underset{y}{f_e^*}$$

$$\left( \begin{array}{l} x, y \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\} \\ x(y+1) \leq \frac{5}{3}x^2 + \frac{1}{3}y^2 \end{array} \right) \text{Max!}$$

$$\leq \sum_e a_e \left( \frac{5}{3} f_e^* + \frac{1}{3} f_e^2 \right) + \frac{5}{3} \sum_e b_e f_e^*$$

$$+ \frac{1}{3} \sum_e b_e f_e$$

$$= \frac{5}{3} \left( \underbrace{\sum_e (a_e f_e^* + b_e f_e^*)}_{c_e(f_e^*)} \right) + \frac{1}{3} \left( \sum_e (a_e f_e + b_e f_e) \right)$$

$$= \frac{5}{3} \text{cost}(P^*) + \frac{1}{3} \text{cost}(P).$$

$$\text{cost}(P) \leq \text{cost}(P^*) + \frac{1}{2} \text{cost}(P)$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{cost}(P) \leq \frac{5}{3} \text{cost}(P^*) + \frac{1}{3} \text{cost}(P)$$

$$\Rightarrow (1 - \frac{1}{3}) \text{cost}(P) \leq \frac{5}{3} \text{cost}(P^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{\text{PoA} = \frac{\text{cost}(P)}{\text{cost}(P^*)} \leq \frac{5/3}{2/3} = \frac{5}{2}}$$

0.  $P$ : NE  
 $P^*$ : OPT.

$$1. \text{cost}(P) = \sum_{i \in N} G(P_i, P_i) \leq \sum_{i \in N} G(P_i^*, P_i)$$

( $\because P$  is a NE).

$$2. \sum_{i \in N} G(P_i^*, P_i) \leq \frac{5}{3} \text{cost}(P^*) + \frac{1}{3} \text{cost}(P).$$

$\downarrow \lambda$                        $\downarrow \mu$

$$3. \text{D. 2} \Rightarrow (1 - \frac{1}{3}) \text{cost}(P) \leq \frac{5}{3} \text{cost}(P^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{PoA} = \frac{\text{cost}(P)}{\text{cost}(P^*)} = \frac{5/3}{(1 - 1/3)}$$

$\nearrow \lambda$                        $\nearrow \mu$

★  $(\lambda, \mu)$  - Smooth game (for  $\mu \leq 1$ ).

for any  $P, P^*$

$$\lambda \text{cost}(P^*) + \mu \text{cost}(P)$$

for any  $P, P^*$

$$\sum_{i \in N} c_i(p_i^*, p_{-i}) \leq \lambda \text{cost}(P^*) + \mu \text{cost}(P)$$

Then:  $P_0A$  of  $(\lambda, \mu)$ -smooth game is

$$\leq \frac{\lambda}{(1-\mu)}$$

$$P_0A^{NE} \leq P_0A^{CE} \leq P_0A^{CCE} \leq \frac{\lambda}{(1-\mu)}$$

$$P_0A = \frac{\text{cost at worst eq}}{\text{opt cost.}}$$

