

Data Plane Verification: Anteater and VeriFlow

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
December 5, 2013

Managing networks is challenging



Production networks are complex

- Security policies
 - Traffic engineering
 - Legacy devices
 - Protocol inter-dependencies
 - ...
-
- Even well-managed networks have downtime & security vulnerabilities
 - Few good tools to ensure all networking components working together correctly



A real example from UIUC




Previously, an intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) device inspected all traffic to/from dorms


IDP couldn't handle load; added bypass

- IDP only inspected traffic between dorm and campus
- Seemingly simple changes

How do you know if it worked?



Understanding your network



Flow monitoring

Screenshot from Scrutinizer
NetFlow & sFlow analyzer,
snmp.co.uk/scrutinizer/

```
hostname bgpdA
password zebra
!
router bgp 8000
  bgp router-id 10.1.4.2

! for the link between A and B
  neighbor 10.1.2.3 remote-as 8000
  neighbor 10.1.2.3 update-source lo0

  network 10.0.0.0/7

! for the link between A and C
  neighbor 10.1.3.3 remote-as 7000
  neighbor 10.1.3.3 ebgp-multihop
  neighbor 10.1.3.3 next-hop-self
  neighbor 10.1.3.3 route-map PP out

! for link between A and D
  neighbor 10.1.4.3 remote-as 6000
  neighbor 10.1.4.3 ebgp-multihop
  neighbor 10.1.4.3 next-hop-self
  neighbor 10.1.4.3 route-map TagD in

! route update filtering
  ip community-list 1 permit 8000:1000
!
```

Configuration verification

Past approach: Config. verification




e.g.: RCC for BGP

[Feamster &
Balakrishnan,
NSDI'05]

Margrave for
firewalls


[Nelson, Barratt,
Dougherty, Fidler,
Krishnamurthi,
LISA'10]



Data plane verification




*Our approach: Verify the network
as close as possible to its actual behavior*



Data plane verification




*Our approach: Verify the network
as close as possible to its actual behavior*



- Unified analysis across control software
- Catch bugs in control software
- Checks current snapshot

Architecture overview





Anteater

- [Mai, Khurshid, Agarwal, Caesar, Godfrey, King, SIGCOMM 2011]
- Offline verification of data plane

VeriFlow

- [Khurshid, Zhou, Caesar, Godfrey, HotSDN 2012 (best paper)]
- [Khurshid, Zou, Zhou, Caesar, Godfrey, NSDI 2013]
- Online real-time verification of data plane
- Interoperates with OpenFlow controller



Is it possible to check
network-wide invariants
in real time as the
network evolves?

ΠΕΡΙΜΟΡΚ ΕΛΟΙΛΕΣ;

ΠΕΡΙΜΟΡΚ ΕΛΟΙΛΕΣ ΣΤΟ ΟΥΟ




Challenge #1: Obtaining real time view of network

- Solution: interpose between Software Defined Networking (SDN) controller and routers/switches


Challenge #2: Verification speed

- Past tools too slow and/or not incremental
- Solution: Algorithms :-)


VeriFlow architecture



VeriFlow architecture





Verifying invariants quickly




Find only equivalence classes affected by the update via a multidimensional trie data structure

Verifying invariants quickly



All the info to answer queries!

Verifying invariants quickly






Simulated network

- Real-world BGP routing tables (RIBs) from RouteViews totaling 5 million RIB entries
- Injected into 172-router network (AS 1755 topology)

Measure time to process each forwarding change

- 90,000 updates from Route Views
- Check for loops and black holes

Microbenchmark latency



97.8% of updates verified within 1 ms

Deployment



Deployed Anteatr and VeriFlow in University of Illinois campus backbone

- 244 routers, serving 70,000+ machines
- Predominantly OSPF, BGP, and static routing
- State collected via vty scripts

Forwarding loops




IDP was overloaded,
operator introduced
bypass

- IDP only inspected
traffic for campus

bypass routed campus
traffic to IDP through
static routes

Introduced 9 loops



Errors discovered



Loops in internal network

Externally-exploitable DoS vulnerability

Packet loss due to 'stale' configs

Inconsistent security policy: over-exposure of router management interface

Duplicate IP addresses on router interfaces

Router vendor software error: faulty config output



Configuration verification

- [Al-Shaer2004, Bartal1999, Benson2009, Feamster2005, Yuan2006]

Data plane verification

- Static reachability in IP networks [Bush'03, Xie'05]
- FlowChecker [Al-Shaer, Al-Haj, SafeConfig '10]
- ConfigChecker [Al-Shaer, Al-Saleh, SafeConfig '11]
- Header Space Analysis [Kazemian, Varghese, and McKeown, NSDI '12]
- NetPlumber [Kazemian, Chang, Zeng, Varghese, McKeown, Whyte, NSDI '13]

What we've seen



Data plane verification is valuable

- Unified network-wide analysis across protocols
- Demonstrated effectiveness in large campus network

Real-time verification is feasible

- millisecond timescales enabled by SDN + algorithms

Thanks!