


Lecture 23





# Outline





Garbled Circuits:  
Security




Q & A from Homework

# Garbled Circuits: Security




$C(a, b)$



Ideal world



Real world






# Garbled Circuits: Security



# Garbled Gate

0	0	0
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1



opp map.





randomly permuted

$Enc_{K_0,w_1}(Enc_{K_0,w_2}(K_0,w_5))$
$Enc_{K_0,w_1}(Enc_{K_1,w_2}(K_0,w_5))$
$Enc_{K_1,w_1}(Enc_{K_0,w_2}(K_0,w_5))$
$Enc_{K_1,w_1}(Enc_{K_1,w_2}(K_1,w_5))$

(randomly permuted) Simulator's table

$Enc_{\bar{K}}(Enc_{K''}(0 \dots 0))$
$Enc_{\bar{K}}(Enc_{\bar{K}}(0 \dots 0))$
$Enc_{\underline{K}}(Enc_{K'''}(K'''))$
$Enc_{\underline{K'}}(Enc_{\bar{K}}(0 \dots 0))$





$Sim(b, z) : (\text{Garbled Table } G, \text{Keys}, \text{output map})$   
 where  $z = C(a, b)$

AND.

$k_a$	$k_b$	$K$
0	0	0
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1

permute

$E_{k_{a,0}}(E_{k_{b,0}}(K_0))$	XOR $K_0$
$E_{k_{a,0}}(E_{k_{b,1}}(K_0))$	$K_1$
$E_{k_{a,1}}(E_{k_{b,0}}(K_0))$	$K_1$
$E_{k_{a,1}}(E_{k_{b,1}}(K_1))$	$K_0$

$a = 0$   
 $\Rightarrow$  Send  $k_{a,0}$ .  
 Use OT to transmit  
 1 out of  $k_{b,0}, k_{b,1}$  to Bob.

Bob's input  $b = 1$  (w.l.o.g.)

=

$E_{k_{a,0}}(E_{k_{b,1}}(K_0))$	$K_0 \rightarrow 0$
$E_{k_{a,1}}(E_{k_{b,1}}(K_1))$	$K_1 \rightarrow 1$
$E_{k_{a,1}}(E_{k_{b,0}}(K_0))$	
$E_{k_{a,0}}(E_{k_{b,0}}(K_0))$	

Game 1 Same as Alice's interaction with Bob, except invoke OT simulator to learn Bob's input  $b$ , send  $k_{b,1}$  to Sim.

Claim 1: Bob's view in interaction with Alice  $\approx$  Bob's view in Game 1 [OT simulation security]

Game 2: Same as Game 1, except.

$E_{k_{a,0}}(E_{k_{b,1}}(K_0))$
$E_{k_{a,1}}(E_{k_{b,1}}(0 \dots 0))$
$E_{k_{a,1}}(E_{k_{b,0}}(K_0))$
$E_{k_{a,0}}(E_{k_{b,0}}(K_0))$

Claim 2: Bob's view in Game 1  $\approx$  Bob's view in Game 2.

$\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\leftarrow) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\leftarrow) = 1] \right| = \text{negl.}$$


Proof: Suppose not, then  $\mathcal{W}$  that contradicts CPA-security of our encryption scheme.

$\mathcal{W}$  submits to CPA ch.

$$m_0 = E_{k_{b,1}}(k_1)$$


$$m_1 = E_{k_{b,1}}(0 \dots 0)$$

Obtains  $\left( E_{k_{a,1}}(m_d) \right)^{c^*}, E_{k_{a,1}}^{c^*}(E_{k_{b,0}}(k_0))$



If  $d=0$ , Game 1  
 $d=1$ , Game 2.

Game 3:




Bob obtains  $k_{a,0}, k_{b,1}$ .

Claim 3: Bob's view in Game 2  $\approx$  Bob's view in Game 3.



Game 4:



$K_0 : 0$

$K_1 : 1$

Send  $K_{a,0}$  ( $K_{b,1}$ ) to Bob  
via OT sim.

Claim 4: Bob's view in Game 3  $\approx$  Bob's view in Game 4.

Note: Game 4 is identical to Simulator's output upto renaming  $K_{a,0} \rightarrow \bar{K}$


$K_{b,1} \rightarrow \bar{\bar{K}}$

$K_0 \rightarrow K_{out}$

Simulator:



$b=1,$   
 $z=0.$



$(K_{out} \rightarrow 0,$   
 $\bar{K} \rightarrow 1)$

$(\bar{K}, \bar{\bar{K}})$