# **Project 1: Cryptography**

This project is due on **Wednesday, February 11** at **6:00pm** and counts for 8% of your course grade. Late submissions will be penalized by 10% plus an additional 10% every 5 hours until received. You may submit one assignment late this term without this penalty. In either case, late work will not be accepted after 20 hours past the deadline. If you have a conflict due to travel, interviews, etc., please plan accordingly and turn in your project early.

This is a group project; you will work in **teams of two** and submit one project per team. Please find a partner as soon as possible. If have trouble forming a team, post to Piazza's partner search forum.

The code and other answers your group submits must be entirely your own work, and you are bound by the Student Code. You may consult with other students about the conceptualization of the project and the meaning of the questions, but you may not look at any part of someone else's solution or collaborate with anyone outside your group. You may consult published references, provided that you appropriately cite them (e.g., with program comments), as you would in an academic paper.

Solutions must be submitted electronically in any of the group member's svn directory, following the submission checklist below. Clearly state all member's netids of the team. Details on the filename and submission guideline is listed at the end of the document.

"Anyone, from the most clueless amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an algorithm that he himself can't break."

- Bruce Schneier

# Introduction

In this project, you will investigate multiple ciphers decryption, furthermore breaking them, and vulnerabilities in widely used cryptographic hash functions, including length-extension attacks and collision vulnerabilities. In Part 1, you will be decrypting two symmetric ciphers with given ciphertexts and key values. Then, you will use the same technique to break a weak cipher with a limited key space. In Part 2, you will start out with a small exercise that uses a hash function to observe the avalanche effect, and then build a weak hash algorithm and find collision on a given string. In Part 3, we will guide you through attacking the authentication capability of an imaginary server API. The attack will exploit the length-extension vulnerability of hash functions in the MD5 and SHA family. In Part 4, you will use a cutting-edge tool to generate different messages with the same MD5 hash value (collisions). You'll then investigate how that capability can be exploited to conceal malicious behavior in software.

## **Objectives:**

- Understand how to apply basic cryptographic integrity primitives.
- Investigate how cryptographic failures can compromise the security of applications.
- Appreciate why you should use HMAC-SHA256 as a substitute for common hash functions.

## **Guidelines**

- You SHOULD work in a group of 2.
- You MAY use any programming language you're comfortable with, but we are using Python.
- You MAY use any API or library you like. Don't re-invent the wheel.
- Your answers may or may not be the same as your classmates'.
- You MUST submit your answers in your SVN repository; we will only grade what's there!

# **SVN Directory**

https://subversion.ews.illinois.edu/svn/sp15-cs461

# **Files**

All the necessary files to start the project will given under the folder called "mp1" in your SVN directory. We've also generated some (nearly) empty files for you to submit your answers in.

# Part 1. Symmetric Encryption

In this section, you will be either building or using existing libraries to experiment with two symmetric ciphers: substitution and AES. The tasks include decrypting and breaking.

## 1.1 Substitution Cipher

### **Files**

```
    sub_key.txt: key
    sub_ciphertext.txt: ciphertext
```

sub\_key.txt contains a permutation of the 26 upper-case letters that represents the key for a substitution cipher. Using this key, the *i*th letter in the alphabet in the plaintext has been replaced by the *i*th letter in sub\_key.txt to produce ciphertext in sub\_ciphertext.txt. For example, if the first three letters in your sub\_key.txt are ZDF..., then all As in the plaintext have become Zs in the ciphertext, all Bs have become Ds, and all Cs have become Fs. The plaintext we encrypted is a clue from the gameshow Jeopardy and has only upper-case letters, numbers and spaces. Numbers and spaces in the plaintext were not encrypted. They appear exactly as they did in the plaintext.

What to submit Submit the file sub\_plaintext.txt which is obtained using sub\_key.txt to decrypt sub\_ciphertext.txt.

# 1.2 AES: Decrypting AES

#### **Files**

```
1. aes key.hex: key
```

2. aes iv.hex: initialization vector

3. aes ciphertext.hex: ciphertext

aes\_key.hex contains a 256-bit AES key represented as a series of hexadecimal values. aes\_iv.hex contains a 128-bit Initialization Vector in a similar representation. We encrypted a Jeopardy clue using AES in CBC mode with this key and IV and wrote the resulting ciphertext (also stored in hexadecimal) in aes\_ciphertext.hex.

What to submit Decrypt the ciphertext and submit the plaintext in aes plaintext.txt.

## 1.3 AES: Breaking A Weak AES Key

#### **Files**

1. aes\_weak\_ciphertext.hex: ciphertext

As with the last task, we encrypted a Jeopardy clue using 256-bit AES in CBC and stored the result in hexadecimal in the file aes\_weak\_ciphertext.hex. For this task, though, we haven't supplied the key. All we'll tell you about the key is that it is 256 bits long and its 251 most significant (leftmost) bits are all 0's. The initialization vector was set to all 0s. First, find all plaintexts in the given key space. Then, you will review the plaintexts to find the correct plaintext that is in Jeopardy clue and the corresponding key.

What to submit Find the key of the appropriate plaintext and submit it in aes weak key.txt.

## Part 2. Hash Functions

This assignment will give you a chance to explore cryptographic hashing.

### 2.1 Avalanche Effect

#### **Files**

- 1. hashdiff input string.txt: original string
- 2. hashdiff\_perturbed\_string.txt: perturbed string

hashdiff input string.txt contains another Jeopardy clue in ASCII.

hashdiff\_perturbed\_string.txt is an exact copy of this string with one bit flipped. We're going to use these two strings to demonstrate the avalanche effect by generating the SHA-256 hash of both strings and counting how many bits are different in the two results (a.k.a. the Hamming distance.)

What are their SHA-256 hashes? Verify that they're different.

```
($ openssl dgst -sha256 hash input string.txt hashdiff perturbed string.txt)
```

What to submit Compute the number of bits different between the two hash outputs and submit it in hashdiff\_difference.txt as a single decimal number.

# 2.2 Weak Hashing Algorithm

#### **Files**

1. spr input string.txt: input string

Below you'll find the pseudocode for a weak hashing algorithm we're calling WHA. It operates on bytes (block size 8-bits) and outputs a 32-bit hash.

First, you'll need to implement WHA in the language of your choice. Here are some sample inputs to test your implementation: WHA("Hello world!") = 0x50b027cf and WHA("I am Groot.")=0x57293cbb

In the file spr\_input\_string.txt, you'll find another Jeopardy clue (surprise!) Your goal is to find another string that produces the same WHA output as this Jeopardy clue. In other words, demonstrate that this hash is not second preimage resistant.

What to submit Find a string with the same WHA output as spr\_input\_string.txt and submit it in spr\_second\_collision\_string.txt. Also, submit the code for WHA algorithm code with the name wha\_collision.py. (Given WHA code format is in python but any other preferred programming language is accepted.)

# Part 3. Length Extension

In most applications, you should use MACs such as HMAC-SHA256 instead of plain cryptographic hash functions (e.g. MD5, SHA-1, or SHA-256), because hashes, also known as digests, fail to match our intuitive security expectations. What we really want is something that behaves like a pseudorandom function, which HMACs seem to approximate and hash functions do not.

One difference between hash functions and pseudorandom functions is that many hashes are subject to *length extension*. All the hash functions we've discussed use a design called the Merkle-Damgård construction. Each is built around a *compression function* f and maintains an internal state s, which is initialized to a fixed constant. Messages are processed in fixed-sized blocks by applying the compression function to the current state and current block to compute an updated internal state, i.e.  $s_{i+1} = f(s_i, b_i)$ . The result of the final application of the compression function becomes the output of the hash function.

A consequence of this design is that if we know the hash of an n-block message, we can find the hash of longer messages by applying the compression function for each block  $b_{n+1}, b_{n+2}, \ldots$  that we want to add. This process is called length extension, and it can be used to attack many applications of hash functions.

## 3.1 Experiment with Length Extension in Python

To experiment with this idea, we'll use a Python implementation of the MD5 hash function, though SHA-1 and SHA-256 are vulnerable to length extension in the same way. You can download the pymd5 module at https://courses.engr.illinois.edu/cs461/static/pymd5.py and learn how to use it by running \$ pydoc pymd5. To follow along with these examples, run Python in interactive mode (\$ python -i) and run the command from pymd5 import md5, padding.

Consider the string "Use HMAC, not hashes". We can compute its MD5 hash by running:

```
m = "Use HMAC, not hashes"
h = md5()
h.update(m)
print h.hexdigest()

or, more compactly, print md5(m).hexdigest(). The output should be:
3ecc68efa1871751ea9b0b1a5b25004d
```

MD5 processes messages in 512-bit blocks, so, internally, the hash function pads m to a multiple of that length. The padding consists of the bit 1, followed by as many 0 bits as necessary, followed by a 64-bit count of the number of bits in the unpadded message. (If the 1 and count won't fit in the current block, an additional block is added.) You can use the function padding(count) in the pymd5 module to compute the padding that will be added to a count-bit message.

Even if we didn't know m, we could compute the hash of longer messages of the general form m + padding(len(m)\*8) + suffix by setting the initial internal state of our MD5 function to MD5(m), instead of the default initialization value, and setting the function's message length counter to the size of m plus the padding (a multiple of the block size). To find the padded message length, guess the length of m and run bits =  $(length_of_m + len(padding(length_of_m*8)))*8$ .

The pymd5 module lets you specify these parameters as additional arguments to the md5 object:

```
h = md5(state="3ecc68efa1871751ea9b0b1a5b25004d".decode("hex"), count=512)
```

Now you can use length extension to find the hash of a longer string that appends the suffix "Good advice". Simply run:

```
x = "Good advice"
h.update(x)
print h.hexdigest()
```

to execute the compression function over x and output the resulting hash. Verify that it equals the MD5 hash of m + padding(len(m)\*8) + x. Notice that, due to the length-extension property of MD5, we didn't need to know the value of m to compute the hash of the longer string—all we needed to know was m's length and its MD5 hash.

This component is intended to introduce length extension and familiarize you with the Python MD5 module we will be using; you will not need to submit anything for it.

## 3.2 Conduct a Length Extension Attack

#### **Files**

1. query.txt: query

2. command3.txt: command3

One example of when length extension causes a serious vulnerability is when people mistakenly try to construct something like an HMAC by using  $hash(secret \parallel message)$ , where  $\parallel$  indicates concatenation. For example, Professor Vuln E. Rabble has created a web application with an API that allows client-side programs to perform an action on behalf of a user by loading URLs of the form:

http://cs461ece422.org/project1/api?token=b301afea7dd96db3066e631741446ca1 &user=admin&command1=ListFiles&command2=NoOp

where token is MD5(user's 8-character password  $\parallel$  user=.... [the rest of the URL starting from user= and ending with the last command]).

Text files with the query of the URL query.txt and the command line to append command3.txt will be provided. Using the techniques that you learned in the previous section and without guessing the password, apply length extension to create a new query in the URL ending with command specified in the file, &command3=DeleteAllFiles, that is treated as valid by the server API.

*Hint:* You might want to use the quote() function from Python's urllib module to encode non-ASCII characters in the URL.

*Historical fact:* In 2009, security researchers found that the API used by the photo-sharing site Flickr suffered from a length-extension vulnerability almost exactly like the one in this exercise.

**What to submit** A Python 2.x script named len\_ext\_attack.py and text file query\_updated.txt. Python script should perform such that:

- 1. Accepts a valid query in the URL as a file input and parse the file.
- 2. Modifies the query in the URL so that it will execute the DeleteAllFiles command as the user.

A text file with updated query

## Part 4. MD5 Collisions

MD5 was once the most widely used cryptographic hash function, but today it is considered dangerously insecure. This is because cryptanalysts have discovered efficient algorithms for finding *collisions*—pairs of messages with the same MD5 hash value.

The first known collisions were announced on August 17, 2004 by Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, and Hongbo Yu. Here's one pair of colliding messages they published:

### Message 1:

d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89 55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0 e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70

### Message 2:

d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89 55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0 e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70

Convert each group of hex strings into a binary file. (On Linux, run \$ xxd -r -p file.hex > file.)

- 1. What are the MD5 hashes of the two binary files? Verify that they're the same. (\$ openssl dgst -md5 file1 file2)
- 2. What are their SHA-256 hashes? Verify that they're different. (\$ openssl dgst -sha256 file1 file2)

This component is intended to introduce you to MD5 collisions; you will not submit anything for it.

# 4.1 Generating Collisions Yourself

In 2004, Wang's method took more than 5 hours to find a collision on a desktop PC. Since then, researchers have introduced vastly more efficient collision finding algorithms. You can compute your own MD5 collisions using a tool written by Marc Stevens that uses a more advanced technique. You can download the fastcoll tool here:

```
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/fastcoll_v1.0.0.5.exe.zip (Windows executable) or http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/fastcoll_v1.0.0.5-1_source.zip (source code)
```

If you are building fastcoll from source, you can compile using this makefile: https://courses.engr.illinois.edu/cs461/static/project1/Makefile. You will also need the Boost libraries. On Ubuntu, you can install these using apt-get install libboost-all-dev. On OS X, you can install Boost via the Homebrew package manager using brew install boost.

- Generate your own collision with this tool. How long did it take?
   (\$ time fastcoll -o file1 file2)
- 2. What are your files? To get a hex dump, run \$ xxd -p file.
- 3. What are their MD5 hashes? Verify that they're the same.
- 4. What are their SHA-256 hashes? Verify that they're different.

What to submit A text file named generating\_collisions.txt containing your answers using the following format.

### **Submission Template**

```
1. time_for_fastcoll (e.g. 3.456s)

----
2.
file1:
file1_hex_dump
file2:
file2_hex_dump

----
3.
file1: file1_md5_hash
file2: file2_md5_hash

----
4.
file1: file1_sha256_hash
file2: file2 sha256 hash
```

#### **4.2** A Hash Collision Attack

The collision attack lets us generate two messages with the same MD5 hash and any chosen (identical) prefix. Due to MD5's length-extension behavior, we can append any suffix to both messages and know that the longer messages will also collide. This lets us construct files that differ only in a binary "blob" in the middle and have the same MD5 hash, i.e.  $prefix \parallel blob_A \parallel suffix$  and  $prefix \parallel blob_B \parallel suffix$ .

We can leverage this to create two programs that have identical MD5 hashes but wildly different behaviors. We'll use Python, but almost any language would do. Copy and paste the following three lines into a file called prefix: (Note: writing below lines yourself may lead to encoding mismatch and the error may occur while running the resulting python code)

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
blob = """
and put these three lines into a file called suffix:
"""
from hashlib import sha256
print sha256(blob).hexdigest()
```

Now use fastcoll to generate two files with the same MD5 hash that both begin with prefix. (\$ fastcoll -p prefix -o coll col2). Then append the suffix to both (\$ cat coll suffix > file1.py; cat col2 suffix > file2.py). Verify that file1.py and file2.py have the same MD5 hash but generate different output.

Extend this technique to produce another pair of programs, good and evil, that also share the same MD5 hash. One program should execute a benign payload: print "I come in peace." The second should execute a pretend malicious payload: print "Prepare to be destroyed!". Note that we may rename these program before grading them.

**What to submit** Two Python 2.x scripts named good.py and evil.py that have the same MD5 hash, have different SHA-256 hashes, and print the specified messages.

# Part 5. Writeup

- 1. With reference to the construction of HMAC, explain how changing the design of the API in Section 1.2 to use token =  $HMAC_{user's\ password}$  (user=....) would avoid the length-extension vulnerability.
- 2. Briefly explain why the technique you explored in Section 2.2 poses a danger to systems that rely on digital signatures to verify the integrity of programs before they are installed or executed. Examples include Microsoft Authenticode and most Linux package managers. (You may assume that these systems sign MD5 hashes of the programs.)

**What to submit** A text file named writeup.txt containing your answers.

# Part 6. 4th Credit Project

Graduate students, 4-hour class participants are required to complete part 6. It is optional to other students. The goal is to guess a number that we will announce in class on February 11. For 3 hour class participants, if you follow the instructions and you guess correctly, we'll drop your lowest homework grade at the end of the term.

Note: You MUST complete this section before the class on Wednesday, February 11.

Here are the rules:

- 1. At the start of class on February 11, professor will announce the winning number, which will be an integer in the range [0,63].
- 2. Prior to the announcement, each student may register one guess. To keep everything fair, your guesses will be kept secret using the following procedure:
  - (a) You'll create a PostScript file that, when printed, produces a single page that contains only the statement: "your\_uniqname guesses n".
  - (b) You'll register your guess by sending an email with the MD5 hash of your file to ece422-staff@illinois.edu. We must receive your hash value before the professor announces the pick.
  - (c) You and your project partner may collaborate and produce a file that includes both of your uniquames, or you may choose to work independently.
- 3. If your guess is correct, you can claim the prize by emailing your PostScript file to the same address. The professor will verify its MD5 hash, print it to a PostScript printer, and check that the statement is correct.

*Hint:* You're allowed to trick us if it will teach us not to use a Turing-complete printer control language with a hash function that has weak collision resistance.

## **Submission Checklist**

Upload to any of the team member's SVN directory, a gzipped tarball (.tar.gz) named as below. The tarball should contain only the following list of files:

Gzipped tarball name: project1. netid1. netid2.tar.gz.

#### **Team Members**

A text file containing netIDs of both members. Place the student's netID, whose directory contain your project submission, at the top of the file.

• partners.txt

### **Submission Template**

netid1 netid2

Note: The tarball should be located in netid1's SVN directory.

#### Part 1

A list of resulting text files:

- sub\_plaintext.txt
- aes\_plaintext.txt
- aes\_weak\_key.txt

### Part 2

A list of text files and code to generate WHA:

- hashdiff\_difference.txt
- spr\_second\_collision\_string.txt
- wha collision.py (or any other preferred language format)

#### Part 3

A Python script that inputs a query of URL and a new command to append, performs the specified attack, and outputs the modified query.

- len ext attack.py
- query\_updated.txt

## Part 4

Part 4.2: A text file with your answers to the four short questions. Part 4.3: Two Python scripts that share an MD5 hash, have different SHA-256 hashes, and print the specified messages.

- generating\_collisions.txt
- good.py
- evil.py

### Part 5.

A text file containing your answers to the two questions.

• writeup.txt

### Part 6. 4th Credit

Before the class on **Wednesday, February 11**, email the MD5 hash of the PostScript file. Note that the output file is in hex string not hexadecimal format of binary file.

• ps\_md5.hex