


Last Time

- Coding SHA-256 and RSA
- Certificates
- Goals of security
 - CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability)
 - Authentication, Authorization, and Least Privilege
- Examples
 - HTTPS: Confidentiality, Integrity, and server Authentication through certificates and symmetric encryption
 - File permissions: Authentication and Authorization through users, groups, and 9-bit permission flags

Learning objectives

- Finish up file permissions
- Introduce blockchain (enough to both understand and implement)



File permissions review

- 9-bit flag in 3 3-bit parts: uuugggooo and rwxrwxrwx
 - u if process owner = file's owning user
 - \circ g if process owner \in file's owning group
 - o otherwise

• Files:

- o r = see its bytes
- w = change its bytes
- \circ x = execute like a program (if and only if also have r)

• Directories:

- \circ r = see what it contains
- w = change what it contains (including renaming contents)
- x = navigate through it to other files/directories

sudo, root, and kernel mode

- Permissions are handled by
 - 1. User code executes a syscall, switching to kernel mode
 - 2. Kernel code compares the process's owner and the requested action to the permission bits
 - 3. If permitted, kernel does the action
 - 4. Kernel switches back to user mode and code
- For the superuser root, step 2 always resolves to "permitted"
- su and sudo request changing the user of the current (su) or new (sudo) process
 - Some users have this permission, others do not
 - Extra password to keep process from doing this without your knowledge

File permissions and least privilege

Least Privilege


A party granted rights to do x should not also get rights to do y

Can Unix-style permissions be used to implement the principle of least privilege (w.r.t. files)?

- If **yes**, explain scenario with all needed, no unneeded rights
- If **no**, explain scenario where needed rights come with unneeded rights

Example scenarios:

- All CS faculty and student have accounts on shared computer
- Need to run an application but don't trust its creator to be non-malicious
- Shared file server for 100-employee tech company



Goal of first successful blockchain

Digital cash with no managing entity

- Anonymous: no connection between online account and physical person
- **Unforgeable**: brute force cannot break system
- Single-owner: coins move, not copied
- **Decentralized**: many computers share control, no one in charge

Anonymous and Unforgeable

Anonymous:

- User ID = a public key
- One human can have any number of User IDs


Unforgeable:

• Cryptographic signatures and hashes


Single-owner, move not copy

- ullet Owner signs a document saying "I'm giving this coin to x"
- Proof I had coin to give?
 - Chain of documents back to coin creation
- Proof I didn't give same coin to two different people?
 - A complete set of all documents ever produced
 - Each document identifies its previous document
 - Only one sequence of states is "correct"


Node = signed transfer (called a **block**)




Node = signed transfer (called a **block**)




Node = signed transfer (called a **block**)




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Node = signed transfer (called a **block**)




Node = signed transfer (called a **block**)



- The **head** of the chain is
 - farthest block from start (with tie-breaking rule)
- Only the state represented by the head is "real"

Node = signed transfer (called a **block**)



- The **head** of the chain is
 - farthest block from start (with tie-breaking rule)
- Only the state represented by the head is "real"
- The head (and thus real state) can change discontinuously

Distributed pointers

- We expect many blocks, with many computers agreeing on state
- To check if action can happen, each computer needs the entire set of blocks
 - Too many to send all with each update
- Solution: communicate just the new block and its old pointer
 - Pointer = hash of pointed-to thing
 - Big hashes to ensure no collisions
 - Hash already needed for signature: re-use that hash
 - Requires that blocks never change (or else hash would change)
 - immutable, indelible, purely functional, persistent

A block with anonymous users might be:

```
"change": {
    "old": hash_value_of_previous_block,
    "src": user1_pub, # public key = user ID for anonymity
    "dst": user2_pub,
    "n": 3, # how much to transfer from src to dst
    "memo": "text to identify the purpose of this block"
},
    "signature": priv(hash_of(change_above), user1_priv, user1_pub)
}
```

A pointer to a block is hash_of(block["change"])

Our blocks will be:

```
"change": {
    "old": hash_value_of_previous_block,
    "src": "user1", # for grading, you can't be anonymous
    "dst": "user2",
    "n": 3, # how much to transfer from src to dst
    "memo": "text to identify the purpose of this block"
},
    "signature": priv(hash_of(change_above), user1_priv, user1_pub)
}
```

A pointer to a block is hash_of(block["change"])

Hashing dicts

- SHA-256 can hash any bytes
- UTF-8 can turn any str to bytes
- JSON can turn block["change"] to str, in several ways:

```
    {"x": "y"} vs. {"x":"y"}

    {"x": 1, "y": 2} vs. {"y": 1, "x": 2}

    {"smile": "©"} vs. {"smile": "\u263A"}
```

 For hashes to work as pointers and in signatures, we need just one unambiguous JSON format.


```
json.dumps(value,
    separators=(',',':'),
    indent=None,
    sort_keys=True,
    ensure_ascii=False)
```


Add arrows to this set of blocks:

start hash: 0

1 x→y old: 1234 hash: 8976 3 y→z old: 0 hash: 1234


2 z→x old: 5678 hash: 1357 Add arrows to this set of blocks:





Can arise for two reasons:


- Someone gave you bad block 1357
- Author of 1357 saw 5678 before you did



Two kinds of (valid) blocks:

- Connected via old pointers back to start
- Disconnected

Assume a new block arrives:




2 z→x old: 5678 hash: 1357 1 w→q old: 8976 hash: 5678

Connect if the old is known:


start hash: 0 ld: 1234 hash: 8976 3 y→z old: 0 hash: 1234

2 z→x old: 5678 hash: 1357 1 w→q old: 8976 hash: 5678 Then check for any disconnected blocks that might now be connectable



Forking

The blockchain is said to have **forked** if it isn't just one list



Causes of forking

- Malice (I pay you, then go back to a state from before the payment)
- Race conditions

Review: race conditions

From our text (emphasis added):

In general a race condition is any time that the outcome of a program depends on the order in which different threads do different things.

A common version of a race condition has the following structure:

- 1. Thread 1 checks some value in memory to decide what to do.
- 2. Thread 2 changes that value.
- 3. Thread 1 does the thing that the old value wanted it to do, but that is no longer correct because of the change thread 2 made.

The "common version" is an example of a **data race**

Data race is impossible with blockchain – why?

• Blocks are **immutable** – there's no state that can change.

Blockchain race condition

Users/agents on different computers, not different threads

User 1

- 1. create a block from head
 - 2. add to own chain
 - 3. send to other users
 - 4. update head
 - 1. recieve block
 - 2. add to own chain
 - 3. update head

User 2

- 1. create a block from head
 - 2. add to own chain
 - 3. send to other users
 - 4. update head
 - 1. recieve block
 - 2. add to own chain
 - 3. update head
- Can use synchronization primitives to make each box above atomic
- Cannot use synchronization primitives to control what other computers are doing
 - Forks might arise by resulting distributed race condition

Intentionally forking the blockchain

Attack:

- 1. Pay for something on blockchain
- 2. Receive what you paid for
- 3. Add many transactions starting from the block *before* your payment to make a new fork that becomes the head

Defenses:

- **Proof of Work**: Adding a block takes hours of compute and expensive electricity
- **Proof of Stake**: Users must have large accounts to add a block
- Non-anonymous: Bad actors (and their forks) are banned

Our final project


- Some students wanted gambling, some did not
 - Solution: carnival



Final project design

- MP10
 - o blockchain.py you write, implement blockchain
 - bc_agent.py we wrote, implement blockchain communication and web API
 - oconfigs/pub.json and configs/priv_user.json contains the allowed keys
 - Testing files with MP10; project files will be placed on each VM
- Project
 - o game.py web service part of your carnival booth
 - Sends HTTP requests to bc_agent.py
 - game.html front-end of your carnival booth
 - Use of AI to create this file is encouraged

File	Author	Contents	Communication
blockchain.py	Students (MP10)	Blockchain logic	None
bc_agent.py	Staff	Blockchain API	Between agents
<pre>configs/ *.json</pre>	Staff	Public keys, URLs, etc.	N/A
game.py	Students (Project)	Game logic	HTTP requests to bc_agent.py
game.html	AI (Project)	Game UI	HTTP requests to game.py



What backs cryptocurrency?

- Currency's value is our trust that others will value it
 - requires stability of supply
 - requires backing to bootstrap trust
- Backed by another currency
 - bank account, casino token, gold standard
- Backed by goods and services
 - o gift card, arcade token, event ticket
- Backed by force
 - government taxes/fines, criminal ransom/protection/blackmail

Once backed, strengthens through use and speculation