

LECTURE - 20.

$$q = 2^{\text{poly}(m)}.$$

Last time :

$$C_1 = R_1 B + \mu_1 G$$

$\begin{bmatrix} A, A^{ste} \end{bmatrix}$
 ↗

$$C_2 = R_2 B + \mu_2 G$$

$C_2 t \rightarrow R_2 B t + \mu_2 G t = (\mu_2 G t) + \text{"low norm error"}$
 Want to obtain $C^* = \text{Enc}(\mu_1 \cdot \mu_2)$

C^* should decrypt to $\mu_1 \cdot \mu_2$
 We want
 $C^* t = \mu_1 \mu_2 G t + \text{"low norm error"}$

$$C^* = (C_1 G^{-1}) C_2 \quad |e| \rightarrow B.$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 C^* t &= (C_1 G^{-1}) \underline{C_2 t} \\
 &\quad (\mu_2 G t + R_2 e) \\
 &= C_1 G^{-1} R_2 e + \mu_2 \underline{C_1 G^{-1} G t} \\
 &\quad = C_1 \\
 &= (C_1 G^{-1}) R_2 e + \mu_2 \underline{C_1 t} \\
 &\quad = (\mu_1 G t + R_1 e) \\
 &= (C_1 G^{-1}) R_1 e + \mu_2 \mu_1 G t + \mu_2 R_1 e
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \overbrace{\quad\quad\quad}^{\downarrow} \overbrace{\quad\quad\quad}^{\downarrow} \overbrace{\quad\quad\quad}^{\downarrow} \\
 \text{low norm} \quad \text{low norm} \quad \text{low norm}
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{c}
 \overbrace{\quad\quad\quad}^{\downarrow} \\
 \sim m \cdot \text{norm of } e
 \end{array}$$

$\sim m^2 \cdot \text{norm of } e$
 "small".

$$= \mu_2 \mu_1 G t + \text{"low norm error".}$$

(AND / XOR / NOT) are universal for classical computations.

Bootstrapping helps reduce noise in ciphertexts

What about Quantum operations?

$$C = \otimes \text{Enc}(p)$$

$$= X^x Z^z p (X^x Z^z)^+ \text{Enc}_{\text{classical}}(x, z)$$

We want to obtain $C' = \otimes \text{Enc}(X p X^+)$

$$C = (\sigma, ct) \\ \stackrel{=}{{}_{\text{HE}.\text{Enc}}}(x, z)$$

↓ ??.

$$C' = (\sigma, ct') \\ \stackrel{=}{{}_{\text{HE}.\text{Enc}}}(\text{??})$$

$$\text{s.t. } C' = Q.\text{Enc}(X\rho X^+)$$

I know $\sigma = X^x Z^z \rho (X^x Z^z)^+$ for
 $ct = \text{HE}.\text{Enc}(x, z)$.

I would like ct' to encrypt (x', z')

$$\text{s.t. } \sigma = X^{x'} Z^{z'} (X\rho X^+) (X^{x'} Z^{z'})^+$$

$$X^x Z^z \rho (X^x Z^z)^+ = X^{x'} Z^{z'} (X\rho X^+) (X^{x'} Z^{z'})^+$$

$$x' = x \oplus 1$$

$$z' = z.$$

To evaluate X and Z gates, just update the classical encryption.

Clifford Gates.

Include $(X, Z, H, P, \text{CNOT})$

$\forall C \in \{X, Z, H, P, \text{CNOT}\}$.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\phi} \end{bmatrix}$$

\forall pure state $|\psi\rangle$, $\exists (x, z) \in (x', z')$ such that
 $C X^x Z^z |\psi\rangle = X^{x'} Z^{z'} C |\psi\rangle$.

Operate on a ciphertext

$$Ct = (\Gamma, ct)$$

$$\downarrow X^x Z^z \rho (X^x Z^z)^+ \hookrightarrow \text{Enc}(x, z)$$


\downarrow To homomorphically evaluate a Clifford gate,
 replace quantum part with

$$C \sigma C^\dagger = C X^x Z^z \rho (X^x Z^z)^+ C^\dagger$$

$$\text{By prop. of Cliffords} = X^{x'} Z^{z'} C \rho C^\dagger (X^{x'} Z^{z'})^\dagger$$

replace classical part with $\text{Enc}_{\text{classical}}(x', z')$.

Toffoli gate = CCNOT



Clifford + Toffoli is universal for quantum computation


Mahadev - 2019.

TRAPDOOR CLAW-FREE FUNCTION PAIR:

(TCF).

Pair of functions f_0, f_1 such that:

1) Both injective, same image



2) Hard to find a "claw"

i.e. (x_0, x_1) such that $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1)$

3) There is a trapdoor td that enables efficient inversion, given any $y \in \text{Image}$

and trapdoor td , can efficiently compute

(x_0, x_1) s.t. $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1) = y$.

How to obtain a superposition over a class.

i.e. given (f_0, f_1) , compute:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |0, x_0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |1, x_1\rangle$$

$$\text{s.t. } f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1)$$

[By property 2 of TCF, outputting both (x_0, x_1) is hard].

1) Prepare a uniform superposition

$$|\Psi\rangle = \sum_{\substack{b \in \{0,1\}, \\ x \in \{0,1\}^n}} |b\rangle |x\rangle |0\rangle .$$

2) Apply unitary

$$(b, x, y) \rightarrow (b, x, y \oplus f_b(x)) .$$

to $|\Psi\rangle$.

Result : $\left[\sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} |b\rangle |x\rangle \right] |f_b(x)\rangle_y .$

$x \in \{0, 1\}^n$
 3) Measure \mathcal{Y} register.
 collapse to : \downarrow
 $|0, x_0\rangle + |1, x_1\rangle \otimes |y\rangle^n$
 s.t. $f_0(x_0) = y$ and
 $f_1(x_1) = y$.
 end of how to get a superposition over claws.

EXTRA PROPERTY OF TCFS :

- 4) There is a ^{hidden} bit s associated with (f_0, f_1) such that for all claws.
 [i.e. all (x_0, x_1) s.t. $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1)$]
 i.e. have $\sqrt{\Gamma_1} \oplus \sqrt{\Gamma_2} = s$.

... now not possible ...

$\Rightarrow (f_0, f_1)$ is an ENCODING /
ENCRYPTION
of s .

If claws were easy to find, s would
not be hidden.

Therefore,

s is hidden \Rightarrow claw-freeness.

We review here the key update rules for performing stabilizer/Clifford operators on quantum data encrypted with the quantum one-time pad [Got98].

$$\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} |\psi\rangle \xrightarrow[\mathcal{X}_i]{} \text{Measure} = c \quad f_{a,i} \leftarrow f_{a,i}$$

Figure 15: Protocol for measurement on the i^{th} wire: Simply perform the measurement. The resulting bit, c , can be decrypted by applying $\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}}$ (The key $f_{b,i}$ is no longer relevant).

$$|0\rangle \xrightarrow[\mathcal{X}_i]{} \mathsf{X}^0 \mathsf{Z}^0 |0\rangle \quad f_{a,i} \leftarrow 0, \quad f_{b,i} \leftarrow 0$$

Figure 16: Protocol for auxiliary qubit preparation on a new wire, i : Initialize a new wire labelled \mathcal{X}_i and new key-polynomials $f_{i,a} = f_{b,i} = 0$.

$$\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} |\psi\rangle \xrightarrow[\mathcal{X}_i]{} \mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} \mathsf{X} |\psi\rangle \quad f_{a,i} \leftarrow f_{a,i}, \quad f_{b,i} \leftarrow f_{b,i}$$

Figure 17: Protocol for an X-gate on the i^{th} wire: Simply apply the X-gate.

$$\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} |\psi\rangle \xrightarrow[\mathcal{X}_i]{} \mathsf{Z} \mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} \mathsf{Z} |\psi\rangle \quad f_{a,i} \leftarrow f_{a,i}, \quad f_{b,i} \leftarrow f_{b,i}$$

Figure 18: Protocol for a Z-gate on the i^{th} wire: Simply apply the Z-gate.

$$\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} |\psi\rangle \xrightarrow[\mathcal{X}_i]{} \mathsf{H} \mathsf{X}^{f_{b,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{H} |\psi\rangle \quad f_{a,i} \leftarrow f_{b,i}, \quad f_{b,i} \leftarrow f_{a,i}$$

Figure 19: Protocol for an H-gate on the i^{th} wire: Apply the gate and swap the key-polynomials.

$$\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} |\psi\rangle \xrightarrow[\mathcal{X}_i]{} \mathsf{P} \mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i} \oplus f_{a,i}} \mathsf{P} |\psi\rangle \quad f_{a,i} \leftarrow f_{a,i}, \quad f_{b,i} \leftarrow f_{b,i} \oplus f_{a,i}$$

Figure 20: Protocol for a P-gate on the i^{th} wire: Apply the gate and update $f_{b,i}$.

$$(\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i}} \otimes \mathsf{X}^{f_{a,j}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,j}}) |\psi\rangle \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{X}_i \\ \mathcal{X}_j \end{array} \right\} (\mathsf{X}^{f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,i} \oplus f_{b,j}} \otimes \mathsf{X}^{f_{a,j} \oplus f_{a,i}} \mathsf{Z}^{f_{b,j}}) \mathsf{CNOT}(|\psi\rangle)$$

$$f_{a,i} \leftarrow f_{a,i}, \quad f_{b,i} \leftarrow f_{b,i} \oplus f_{b,j}, \quad f_{a,j} \leftarrow f_{a,i} \oplus f_{a,j}, \quad f_{b,j} \leftarrow f_{b,j}$$

Figure 21: Protocol for a CNOT-gate with control wire i and target wire j : Apply the gate and update $f_{a,i}$ and $f_{b,j}$.