

# LECTURE - 16

Last-time.

LWE assumption

DLWE  $n, m, q, \chi$

for every QPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,

$$\Pr_{\substack{A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 1}, \\ e \leftarrow \chi^{m \times 1}, b = A \cdot s + e}} [\mathcal{A}(A, b) = 1] = \frac{q^n \text{ possible } s \text{ values,}}{|\text{Supp}(\chi)|^m \text{ possible } e \text{ values}}$$

$$\Pr_{\substack{A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, \\ b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times 1}}} [\mathcal{A}(A, b) = 1] = \text{negl}(n)$$

$q^m$  possible  $b$  values

$$q^m \gg q^n \cdot |\text{supp}(\chi)|^m$$

# ENCRYPTION.

## Multi-message security.

A

$$\vec{m}_0 = m_0^1 \dots m_0^n$$

$$\vec{m}_1 = m_1^1 \dots m_1^n$$

Ch

$$\text{Enc}_K(m_b^1), \text{Enc}_K(m_b^2) \dots \text{Enc}_K(m_b^n)$$

$$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$$K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$$

We require:

$$\vec{b} \rightarrow$$

$\forall$  QPT adversary A

$$\Pr[\tilde{b} = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

One-time pad.  $\text{Enc}(K, m) = K \oplus m.$

This is not multi-message secure.

Why?

ATTACK.

A

$$\begin{array}{c} m_0^1 \quad m_0^2 \\ \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\ \vec{m}_0 = 0^n, 1^n \\ \vec{m}_1 = 0^n, 0^n \end{array} \rightarrow$$

Ch

$$b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$$

$$k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$\text{If } b=0, \quad \underline{k \oplus 0^n, k \oplus 1^n}$$


$$\text{If } b=1, \quad \underline{k \oplus 0^n, k \oplus 0^n}$$

If A obtains  $(k, k \oplus 1^n)$ , it outputs  $\tilde{b}=0$   
"  $(k, k)$  it outputs  $\tilde{b}=1$ .

$$\Pr [b = \tilde{b}] = 1.$$

Single  $k$  of size  $n$ ,

that can be used to derive "pseudorandom" one-time keys, as a deterministic function of  $k$ , one for every message.




$$k_1 \oplus m_b^1$$

$$k_2 \oplus m_b^2$$

⋮

Recall: LWE assumption.

$$(A, Aste) \approx (A, b)$$



Enc( $k, M$ ) : <sup>bit</sup>  
(LWE secret)

Sample  $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times n}, e \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$

Output  $ct = (a, (as + e + \mu \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor)) \bmod q$

How do we decrypt?

Dec( $k, ct$ ) where  $ct = (a, c')$   
<sub>=s</sub>

how should we recover  $\mu$ ,  
given that  $c' = (as + e + \mu) \bmod q$ ?

If no error, then  $\mu = (c' - a \cdot s)$

~~When there is error,  $\mu + e = (c' - a \cdot s)$~~   
~~expand.~~ ~~small~~

Decrypt  $(k, ct)$

where  $ct = (a, c')$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Compute } (c' - a \cdot s) &= \mu \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor + e \\ &= e \quad (\text{i.e. low norm, when } \mu=0). \end{aligned}$$

$$= \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor + e \quad (\text{i.e. high norm, when } \mu=1).$$

Multi-message security.

$\star$

$$\vec{\mu}_0 = \mu_0^1 \dots \mu_0^m$$

Ch.

$$\vec{\mu}_1 = \mu_1^1 \dots \mu_1^m$$

→

$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

$$\text{Enc}_s(\mu_b^1) \dots \text{Enc}_s(\mu_b^m)$$

$$\text{Enc}_s(\mu) = a, a + e + \mu \left( \frac{a}{2} \right)$$

$$a_1, a_1 + e_1 + \mu_b^1 \left( \frac{a}{2} \right), \dots, a_m, a_m + e_m + \mu_b^m \left( \frac{a}{2} \right)$$

A outputs  $\tilde{b}$ .

$\forall \text{ DPT } A$ ,  $\Pr[\tilde{b} = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$   
 equivalently

$$\left| \Pr[\tilde{b} = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[\tilde{b} = 1 | b = 0] \right| = \text{negl}(n)$$

$$a_1, a_1 + e_1 + \mu_b^1 \left( \frac{a}{2} \right), \dots, a_m, a_m + e_m + \mu_b^m \left( \frac{a}{2} \right)$$

$$\left( \begin{array}{c} \xleftarrow{A} a_1 \xrightarrow{\quad} \\ \xleftarrow{\quad} a_2 \xrightarrow{\quad} \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{array} \right), A \begin{bmatrix} s \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}_{n \times 1} + \begin{bmatrix} e_1 \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \mu_b^1 \left( \frac{a}{2} \right) \\ \mu_b^2 \left( \frac{a}{2} \right) \\ \vdots \\ \mu_b^m \left( \frac{a}{2} \right) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\left[ \begin{array}{c} \longleftarrow a_m \longrightarrow \\ \hline \end{array} \right]_{m \times n}$$

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 1}, c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$$

$$[e_m]_{m \times 1}$$

$$[L^{-1}]_{m \times 1}$$

by LWE.

$$\left[ \begin{array}{c} A \\ \hline \end{array} \right] \rightarrow \left[ \begin{array}{c} b \\ \hline \end{array} \right]_{m \times 1} + \left[ \begin{array}{c} \mu_b^1 \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor \\ \vdots \\ \mu_b^m \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor \end{array} \right]_{m \times 1}$$

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$$

$$\left[ \begin{array}{c} A \\ \hline \end{array} \right], \left[ \begin{array}{c} b \\ \hline \end{array} \right]_{m \times 1}$$

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$$



# Quantum One-Time Pad

Goal: Given an arbitrary quantum (mixed) state  $\rho$ , and a classical key  $k$  sampled uniformly,

develop an alg  $\text{Enc}(k, \rho) \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{I}$ .

$$\rho = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix}$$

Modify  $\rho$  by applying unitaries

derived from  $k$ , so that

averaged over all keys, the

resulting density matrix is  $\frac{\mathbb{I}}{2}$ .

Key:  $(a, b) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ .

$$\text{Enc}((a, b), \rho) \rightarrow$$

$$X^a Z^b \rho (X^a Z^b)^\dagger$$

X and Z are Pauli gates

$$X = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad Z = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Enc}((00), \rho) \rightarrow \rho$$

$$\text{Enc}((01), \rho) \rightarrow Z \rho Z^\dagger$$

$$\text{Enc}((10), \rho) \rightarrow X \rho X^\dagger$$

$$\text{Enc}((11), \rho) \rightarrow XZ \rho (XZ)^\dagger$$

$$\text{Dec}((a, b), \sigma) \rightarrow (X^a Z^b)^\dagger \sigma (X^a Z^b)$$

We want to prove:

$$\frac{1}{4} \sum_{a, b \in \{0, 1\}} (X^a Z^b) \rho (X^a Z^b)^\dagger = \frac{\mathbb{I}}{2}$$

Proof.  $\rho = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix}, \alpha + \delta = 1$

$$\frac{1}{4} \sum_{a,b \in \{0,1\}} (X^a Z^b) \rho (X^a Z^b)^\dagger$$

$$= \frac{1}{4} \left( \rho + Z \rho Z^\dagger + X \rho X^\dagger + (XZ) \rho (XZ)^\dagger \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{4} \left( \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & -\beta \\ -\gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \delta & \gamma \\ \beta & \alpha \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \delta & -\gamma \\ -\beta & \alpha \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{4} \begin{bmatrix} 2(\alpha + \delta) & 0 \\ 0 & 2(\alpha + \delta) \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{2} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} = \frac{\mathbb{I}}{2}.$$

$$Z \rho Z^\dagger = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ -\gamma & -\delta \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & -\beta \\ -\gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
X P X^t &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
&= \begin{bmatrix} \gamma & \delta \\ \alpha & \beta \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
&= \begin{bmatrix} \delta & \gamma \\ \beta & \alpha \end{bmatrix}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{1}{4} \sum_{a,b \in \{0,1\}} x^a z^b p_1 (x^a z^b)^t \quad \text{or} \quad x^a z^b p_2 (x^a z^b)^t$$

$$p = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{or} \quad \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

$$X P X^t \quad \text{or} \quad p.$$


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