

Quantum Oblivious Transfer .

CHALLENGER

m_0, m_1

$\forall i \in [n],$
sample EPR pair
 $|00\rangle + |11\rangle$
 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$
on regs A_i, B_i

Bob

b

like to learn m_b .

Send B_1, \dots, B_n

$\hat{\theta}_x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$\forall i, str_i = com(\hat{x}_i, \hat{\theta}_i; r_i)$ $\forall i, \hat{x}_i$ is the result of
measuring $|\psi_i\rangle$ in basis θ_i

TC[n], |T|=n/2

$\forall i \in [n], \theta_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

x_i is the result of
measuring A_i in basis θ_i

$(\hat{x}_i, \hat{\theta}_i, r_i)_{i \in T}$

$\forall i \in T,$
Check: $str_i = com(\hat{x}_i, \hat{\theta}_i; r_i)$

$\forall i \in T$ where $\theta_i = \hat{\theta}_i, x_i = \hat{x}_i$

CHALLENGER

m_0, m_1

$\forall i \in [n]$,
 sample EPR pair
 $|100\rangle + |111\rangle$
 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$
 on regs A_i, B_i

Send B_1, \dots, B_n

Bob
b

like to learn m_b .

$\forall i, \text{str}_i = \text{com}(\hat{x}_i, \theta_i; r_i)$ $\hat{x}_i, \hat{\theta}_i$ is the result of
 measuring $|\psi_i\rangle$ in basis θ

$\text{Find } (\hat{x}_i, \hat{\theta}_i) \forall i \in [n]$
 Random $T \subset [n]$ of size $n/2$.
 $\forall i \in T$, toss coin.
 if coin = HEADS
 measure A_i in basis $\hat{\theta}_i$
 to obtain x_i .
 check $x_i = \hat{x}_i$

If checks pass $\forall i \in T$ s.t. coin = HEADS
 then $\forall i \in [n] \setminus T$, our
 regs A_i are "close to" $|\hat{x}_i\rangle$

$\forall i, \text{w.p. } \frac{1}{2}, \theta_i \neq \hat{\theta}_i$, measured in $\hat{\theta}_i$ uniform bit
 and then $|\hat{x}_i\rangle$

$(\hat{x}_i, \hat{\theta}_i, r_i)$

Commitment checks

$\theta_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ $\forall i \in [n] \setminus T, x_i$

$y_0 = m_0 \oplus \sum_{i \in T} x_i$ $y_1 = m_1 \oplus \sum_{i \in T} \hat{x}_i$

θ_i
 I_0, I_1
 $y_0 + y_1$

$I_b = \{i \in [n] \setminus T : \theta_i = \hat{\theta}_i\}$

$I_{1-b} = \{i \in [n] \setminus T : \theta_i \neq \hat{\theta}_i\}$



Claim: Define $|\Psi'_i\rangle$ as :

$\forall i \in [n] \setminus T$, apply $H^{\otimes i}$ on register A_i .

Then, $|\Psi'_1 \dots \Psi'_n\rangle$ is close to a superposition (ϵ_n) of terms that have low Hamming distance from $(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_n)$ in the computational basis.

[Proof via Sampling]

Classical game



$$z_i = y_i - \hat{x}_i$$

$$\Pr[H \cdot W \cdot \{z_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus T} \geq \epsilon_n]$$

Sample $T \subset [n]$ of size $n/2$, $\leq 2^{-\epsilon_n f(n)}$

Sample $S \subset T$ by picking each $i \in T$ w.p. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Check that $z_i = 0 \quad \forall i \in S$.

$z_1 \dots z_n$ has low Hamming weight $\Rightarrow \{z_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus T}$ also

APPLICATIONS OF OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER

arbitrary

"Securely compute λ functions" on distributed inputs

A

a_1, \dots, a_n

B

b_1, \dots, b_n

Classical

$C(a_1, \dots, a_n, b_1, \dots, b_n)$

A

XOR

B

Inputs: a

Send a to Bob

Outputs :


out: $(a \oplus b)$

AND

A

a

$$x_0 = a \wedge 0, \\ x_1 = a \wedge 1$$



B

b

out: $(a \wedge b)$

Securely evaluate
Single-bit output circuits (polynomial with overhead)

$$C(x_1, \dots, x_n, y_1, \dots, y_n) \rightarrow 0/1.$$


A

B

a_1, \dots, a_n

b_1, \dots, b_n

$$C(a_1, \dots, a_n, b_1, \dots, b_n)$$



Secret sharing of each bit (a_1, \dots, a_n).

Secret sharing of a_1 is a uniform sample from $\{00, 11\}$
 $\{01, 10\}$

$\forall i$,
Secret shares

$$a_i \rightarrow a_i^A, a_i^B$$

A

$$\forall i, SS(a_i) \rightarrow a_i^A, a_i^B$$

$$\frac{a_1^B \dots a_n^B}{\xrightarrow{\hspace{1cm}} b_1^A \dots b_n^A}$$

$$\forall i, SS(b_i) \rightarrow b_i^A, b_i^B$$

then evaluate gate-by-gate as on the
previous slide.

See linked lecture notes from a previous
offering for a detailed description.